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How well do U.S. western water markets convey economic information? 
 






An efficient market implies that potential gains from trade are fully captured. Achieving this 
requires a well-functioning market where prices reflect all available information. In the case of 
water rights markets, this implies that the permanent water rights transfer price reflects the sum of 
discounted returns to this asset (i.e., the lease price), the market interest rate, and a risk premium 
that reflects potential future water scarcity. The purpose of this study is to assess the efficiency of 
western U.S. water rights markets by utilizing the asset pricing model to measure how well prices 
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1. Introduction 
The number and scale of environmental markets have increased over time with successes in 
programs such as air pollution permit trading (Schmalensee and Stavins 2017) and individual 
transferable quota systems for fisheries (Costello, Gaines and Lynham 2008). However, even 
well-functioning environmental markets often fail to achieve their maximum theoretical 
advantage over other allocation or regulation mechanisms (Teitenberg 1990, Keohane 2007). 
The achieved efficiency gains from markets for natural resource assets have also been highly 
variable. Markets for fishing quota appear to be quite successful in this regard (Grainger and 
Costello 2011); those for wetland and habitat preservation, less so (National Research Council 
2001, Parkhurst and Shogren 2003).  
 This paper examines markets for scarce water, advocated by economists for many 
decades (Hartman and Seastone 1970, Vaux and Howitt 1984, Saliba and Bush 1987). While 
informal water markets are common in some developing countries (Bjornlund and McKay 2002), 
formal inter-sectoral water markets have been slow to develop (Easter et al. 1999) and are 
generally immature (Carey, Sunding and Zilberman 2002; Brewer et al. 2008), making empirical 
studies of actual water markets uncommon. Nonetheless, studies have demonstrated potential 
and realized net benefits from trading in California (Hagerty 2019, Bruno and Jessoe 2019), 
south Texas (Chang and Griffin 1992), southern Italy and Spain (Pujol, Raggi, and Viaggi 2006; 
Rey, Garrido, and Calatrava 2014), north-central Chile (Hearne and Easter 1997, Hearne and 
Donoso 2014), Morocco (Diao and Roe 2003), and Australia (Bjornlund and McKay 2002, 
Tisdell 2014, Wheeler, Bjornlund, and Loch 2014, Zuo et al. 2015, Grafton, Horne, and Wheeler 
2016, Loch, Wheeler, and Settre 2018). Australia’s water markets may be especially relevant to 
western U.S. water markets given that a number of regions in the western U.S. are following the 
			 3 
Australian case in the design of their water markets (e.g., Nevada’s Diamond Valley and 
Humboldt Basin; Young 2015, Zeff et al. 2019, Wheeler et al. 2017).  
 U.S. water market efficiency (or the lack thereof) has been examined in the prior 
literature.1 Brookshire et al. (2004) and Brewer et al. (2008) suggest that U.S. western water 
markets are becoming more efficient and that water is moving from lower-valued (agricultural) 
to higher-valued (urban and environmental) uses. But some current water rights transfers in the 
United States are informal, and even active markets may exhibit high transaction costs (Scott and 
Coustalin 1995; Huffaker 2005; Rosegrant, Ringler, and Zhu 2014; Wheeler, Bjornlund, and 
Loch 2014; Hagerty 2019).  
 Market efficiency requires that prices reflect available information about scarcity and 
value in use.  Therefore, an important area of study—which has been largely missing in the water 
market literature—is the role of pricing mechanisms in water rights markets. The purpose of this 
study is to assess the efficiency of western U.S. water rights markets by utilizing the asset pricing 
model to measure how well prices reflect long-run returns to permanent water rights. We exploit 
the variation in prices and quantities for water trades in the western United States between 1990 
and 2010 to assess water markets’ capacity to incorporate available information about long-run 
returns.  
 We apply the financial asset pricing model—similar to Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr 
(2005) and Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007) in their applications to New Zealand fishing 
quota markets—to U.S. water rights markets, econometrically estimating a water transfer price 
 
1 Note that truly efficient markets would also fully address externalities and public goods, important considerations 
in the context of water markets (Olmstead 2010). Our analysis does not consider these potential market failures, and 
instead focuses on the capacity of water market prices to transmit information about the private benefits and costs of 
water use. Finding that water markets do have this capacity would be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to 
support their use (through taxation or other means) to address market failures.  
			 4 
equation for nine western U.S. states for which the requisite data are available. The asset pricing 
model specifies the structural relationship between the permanent transfer price (i.e., the asset 
price) and the lease price (i.e., returns to the asset), the market interest rate, and a risk premium. 
Estimating an empirical specification of the asset pricing model (following Newell et al. 2007) 
allows us to assess the extent to which permanent transfer prices are influenced by these three 
factors, with a central focus on the lease price—the greater the influence of lease price on 
permanent transfer price (controlling for the market interest rate and water scarcity (a measure of 
risk)), the more efficient the market is. 
To our knowledge, the asset pricing model has not been applied to water markets.2 
Despite the small number of observations in our analysis, results suggest that water transfer 
prices are positively correlated with lease prices and negatively correlated with interest rates, as 
asset pricing theory would predict. These results are somewhat surprising. Though Newell, 
Papps, and Sanchirico (2007) find that prices in markets for fishing quota comport with the asset 
pricing model, these markets in New Zealand fisheries may be the most well-functioning created 
markets for natural assets (Grainger and Costello 2014). In water rights markets where prices are 
less stable and more heterogeneous, transaction costs are high, and trading is thin, it would not 
be surprising to find that the data were inconsistent with the asset pricing model (Yoskowitz 
1999, Edwards and Libecap 2015).   
Recognizing that our data include heterogeneous water markets in nine states, we extend 
our analysis to examine whether water market prices convey economic information more 
efficiently in relatively better-functioning markets. We apply the asset pricing model to a small 
regional market (the Mojave Basin area in California), where water transfers and leases represent 
 
2 Asset pricing models have also been applied to natural resource markets such as those for agricultural land (Alston 
1986) and dairy quota (Wilson and Sumner 2004), in addition to fishing quota markets. 
			 5 
trades in more homogeneous goods, trading is more active and better-monitored, and transaction 
costs are likely much lower than in the general case we assess in our multi-state analysis. The 
asset pricing results for the Mojave basin trades are stronger than those in our nine-state model, 
and stronger yet when we focus on the most active regions of that market. These results provide 
reason for optimism about water markets, should barriers to efficient trading be reduced in the 
future.  
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we present the asset pricing model in 
theoretical and empirical formats. Section 3 discusses the multi-state sample transactions, data 
used in the multi-state asset pricing model application, and results. Section 4 presents the asset 
pricing model application to the Mojave market, including data and results. Conclusions are 
provided in section 5.  
 
2. Asset pricing Theory and Empirical Models 
One implication of rational pricing theory for water market transactions is that the present value 
of permanent water rights should equal the discounted value of all future expected earnings from 
annual water leases. With constant lease prices and a constant growth rate, the price of a 
permanent water right would be as in equation (1), where the interest rate (r) is equal to the 





Similar to Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007), who apply the present value asset pricing 
model to examine the relationship between fishing quota asset and lease prices, we use the 
Gordon growth model (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997), as shown in equation (2), and 





   (2)                                                                            
In equation (2), !* is the asset price, in our case the permanent water rights transfer price in 
period /;  is the future annual return from the asset – i.e., the one-year lease price; 0 is the 
interest rate, and 1 is a constant, asset-specific growth rate. 
Water rights markets should be affected by future expectations about the value of water, 
influenced by expected climate conditions and institutional settings. Therefore, as suggested by 
Alston (1986), Cochrane (1992), and Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007), we decompose 0 
into a real market interest rate (  and a risk premium ( ), which in our water market case 
accounts for future water supply uncertainty.3 The variables used to represent each of these 
parameters in the theoretical model are described further in Section 3. Equation (3) provides the 




      (3)                                                                    
We empirically estimate the asset pricing model using data from nine western U.S. states where 
permanent transfers and one-year leases are both prevalent. However, even within a state, 
regional markets vary; for example, from large federal projects like the Colorado-Big Thompson 
(C-BT) project in Colorado or the Central Valley project (CVP) in California, to bilateral 
transactions between two neighboring farmers. Thus, as a second test of the asset pricing model, 
we also use a unique dataset from a single water market known to be relatively well-developed 
and active, located in the Mojave River Basin, in San Bernardino County, California. We repeat 
our empirical tests from the nine-state model on the Mojave River Basin market. 
 
3 Ideally, the risk premium would be specific to a particular water right and address both institutional uncertainty 
and climate uncertainty. Another approach would be to add a multiplicative function that includes factors related to 
uncertainty about the future to the growth model (Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico 2007). However, due to the small 
number of observations in our empirical analysis, this approach is not possible.   
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As in Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007), in our reduced-form empirical tests of the 
asset pricing model in both contexts, we regress water transaction prices on a set of explanatory 
variables as in equation (4),  
 
 56!789* = :; + :=56>789* + :?0̃* + :@A8 + :B18 + :Cµ* + E8 + F789*       (4)                                             
 
where 56! is the log price of permanent water rights transfer G, in state H, in quarter I, and in year 
/; 56> is the log price for a one-year lease;  is the annual real U.S. market interest rate; A  is a 
risk premium; 1 is the growth rate; µ is linear time trend;	E is a state fixed effect or random 
effect; and F is the error term. In Section 3, we describe the variables used for 0̃, A, and	1. In 
well-functioning markets, prices of permanent transfers and leases may be determined 
simultaneously, so we estimate alternative models in which we instrument for own-state lease 
prices using the annual average lease price in all states except the state where a transaction takes 
place. From the asset pricing theory discussed above, we expect , and . The 
expected signs of :@ and :B will depend on the variables used to proxy for A and	1. Generally, a 
riskier asset should have a lower price and one with a higher long-term growth rate in expected 
profits should have a higher price, all else equal. 
 
3.  Multi-state sample data and asset pricing model estimation 
3.1 Water transaction data 
For the dependent variable in the multi-state asset pricing analysis, we purchased water market 
transactions data (permanent water transfers and one-year leases) from Stratecon, Inc. The data 
come from monthly issues of an industry publication, Water Strategist (Smith and Vaughan 
			 8 
1990-94, 1995-2001; Smith 2002-2010), which has been previously described and analyzed in 
the literature (Howe and Goemans 2003; Brookshire et al. 2004; Howitt and Hansen 2005; 
Brown 2006; Brewer et al. 2008; Basta and Colby (2010), Libecap (2010), Colby et al. (2011), 
Grafton et al.(2012), Hansen et al. (2013), Goemans and Pritchet (2014), Hansen et al. (2014), 
Olmstead et al. (2016)).4 We omit observations associated with transactions that are outside the 
scope of our study; e.g., those involving recycled wastewater effluent, water storage rights, and 
multi-year leases as well as those with missing or unreasonable prices (less than $1 per acre-
foot), or unidentified buyers. Additionally, while market transactions from 12 states appear in the 
Water Strategist data, we include only those nine states with at least some years where both one-
year leases and permanent transfers occurred. A minimum number of years with both types of 
transactions occurring in a state is required to estimate equation (4) with state fixed effects.5,6 
The final sample comprises 2,158 transactions in nine states, with one water-supplying sector 
(agriculture), and two water-buying sectors (agriculture and urban) over the period 1990-2010. 
The Water Strategist data product ends in 2010, preventing us from extending the dataset further. 
On average, there are thirteen permanent transfers and six one-year leases per year in 
each state (Figure 1). The average annual number of transactions increased for both permanent 
transfers and leases until the early 2000s, when both dropped significantly, and both have 
declined slightly since then. On average, there have been more permanent trades than leases, 
except in 2001 and again in 2008, when the numbers were very close. Figure 1 also shows that 
the average annual quantity of water permanently transferred by state is much lower and less 
 
4 Until 1995 water transactions were reported in a separate publication associated with the journal Water Intelligence 
Monthly. Transactions were reported quarterly from 1995-1998 and monthly from 1999-2010. Though prior 
researchers have made these data available publicly, we reconstruct the entire nine-state, 21-year panel to ensure that 
the summary data for each transaction (culled from descriptive text in .pdf files) are interpreted consistently. 
5 See the Appendix, Section A1 for an additional discussion regarding omitted data. 
6 Most states have at least one year where they report zero permanent transfers or zero one-year leases. 
			 9 
variable than the annual average quantity leased. Average state water lease and transfer prices 
have trended upward over time, with significant year-to-year variation (Figure 1). 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1, which reveals significant heterogeneity across 
state markets.  Over the period 1990-2010, most states averaged fewer than four permanent 
transfers and fewer than four leases per year. Colorado, in contrast, averaged more than 60 
transfers annually, and California averaged more than 12 one-year leases annually.  
Transfer and lease prices are converted to 2009 dollars using the consumer price index 
(CPI) and are expressed in dollars per acre-foot ($/AF).7 As one would expect, the average 
annual water lease price is much lower than the permanent transfer price for both sectors in all 
states (Table 1). Price dispersion across states is large, especially in the case of permanent 
transfers. This is not surprising, as water cannot be transferred or leased across states, similar to 
prohibitions in fishing quota markets on trades across regions, species, or species-regions. The 
highest prices for water leased to the urban sector are paid in Texas, but prices for water leased 
to agriculture are highest in California. Permanent water rights transfers in both sectors are most 
expensive in Colorado.  
To estimate the asset pricing model in equation (4), we aggregate the nine-state water 
transaction data by state and quarter, so that the dependent variable, pijqt, is the average state-
quarter permanent transfer price, and πijqt is the average state-quarter one-year lease price. This 
reduces our sample size to 66 observations in the nine states over the period 1992-2009. 
Together, six out of nine states account for only 13 observations in the panel, whereas the 
remaining three states – California, Colorado, and Texas – contribute 13, 17, and 23 
observations, respectively. While this small dataset is far from ideal, the Water Strategist is, to 
 
7 An acre-foot, a common unit of volume in U.S. western water trades, is the quantity of water that would flood an 
acre of land to one foot in depth, about 326,000 gallons. 
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our knowledge, the only available data that summarize such a large and diverse set of U.S. 
western water trades that could be used to test the asset pricing model at this scale. 
3.2 Other data used in the multi-state asset pricing models 
Summary statistics for the remaining variables used in the multi-state asset pricing model 
are also reported in Table 2.8 For the real market interest rate (0̃), we use the 3-month U.S. 
Treasury bill rate from the U.S. Federal Reserve (2015) website. Real interest rates are calculated 
by subtracting the inflation rate (measured by the CPI) from these nominal interest rates.  
For the risk premium variable, , we use the Irrigation Vulnerability Index (IVI), 
constructed using the methodology from Liu et al. (2017). The index provides projections of 
future long-term water stress, which we aggregate by state, dividing the difference between 
water supply and water use by irrigation water use. In this index, water supply is the sum of 
surface water (including reservoir storage) and renewable groundwater sources. Water use is the 
sum of irrigation, domestic, industrial and livestock water use.9  Lower values of the IVI indicate 
higher levels of water stress (<0.2 is considered stressed). Additional information about the index 
is provided in the Appendix, Section A2.  
Because the majority of water withdrawals in the region are for irrigation, the growth rate 
variable (1) in equations (3) and (4) should capture expectations about the future returns to using 
water as an input to agriculture. We use the growth rate of farmland acres irrigated for this 
purpose. We know of no projections available for this variable, so we follow Newell, Papps and 
 
8 Table 2 also reports summary statistics for the variables used in estimating the asset pricing model for the Mojave 
market. These data are discussed further in Section 4. 
9 Water supply, water use and irrigation water use are generated by the University of New Hampshire’s Water 
Balance Model at the grid cell level and at daily time steps and provided here as state-level (and basin-level for the 
Mojave models in Section 4) annual aggregates, which we then average over the period 2013-2099 to obtain a time-
invariant measure. In cases where water supply is less than water use, groundwater mining is used to fulfill the water 
use requirement. 
			 11 
Sanchirico (2007), using historical data on farmland acres irrigated at the state level from the 
USDA Irrigation and Water Management Survey (2019) over the period 1988-2018 to estimate 
an AR(1) model expressing growth in value as a function of the natural log of acres irrigated, a 
time trend, and a constant for each state.10 This approach is based on the assumption that the 
drivers of future growth in irrigated land value will be consistent with past drivers. Given our 
approach, the estimate of 1 varies by state, but not over time. 
3.3  Results from the multi-state asset pricing models 
 Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (4) on our multi-state sample. Six 
models are reported in Table 3: three using data from all nine states and, as a robustness check, 
three using only observations from the three states with the largest number of transactions in the 
collapsed panel (California, Colorado and Texas). In these latter models (columns 4-6), the 
sample size shrinks from 66 to 53. In columns (1) and (4), we include state fixed effects (FE) to 
control flexibly and comprehensively for unobservable, non-time-varying state water market 
characteristics. The use of state FEs precludes the identification of coefficients for the risk 
premium and growth rate variables, neither of which vary over time. Thus, we also estimate a RE 
model, which assumes that the variation across water rights markets (states) is random and 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the model. Note that a Hausman test supports the 
RE estimator, failing to reject that RE is consistent and efficient. Estimates are very similar 
across FE and RE models for the coefficients that can be identified in both. 
The coefficients on the lease price are positive, and the coefficients on the real interest 
rate are negative in all six models in Table 3, consistent with the basic principles of asset pricing 
theory. The magnitude of the lease price coefficient is about one-fifth the size of the analogous 
 
10 This survey was formerly the Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey. Data are reported every 5 years. The Durbin’s h 
test statistic of no autocorrelation in AR(1) models was not rejected in all cases except Colorado. 
			 12 
coefficient estimate in the New Zealand fishing quota markets study (Newell, Papps, and 
Sanchirico 2007). In the New Zealand fishing quota case, the lease price coefficient suggests that 
a percent change in the lease price will result in a 76 to 86 percent change in the sale price. In our 
U.S. western water markets case, a percent change in the lease price will result in only a 14 to 17 
percent change in the permanent transfer price, suggesting that the connection between lease 
price and permanent transfer price is weaker in the water markets case. This comparative result is 
not surprising, given that fishing quota markets in New Zealand may be among the world’s most 
efficient created natural resource asset markets (Grainger and Costello 2011), and may thus 
represent a “best case” (thus far) for such markets in practice.11  
The coefficients on the real interest rate, while always negative, are only significant in 
models without the linear time trend. Not surprisingly, adding the time trend also changes the 
magnitude of these coefficient estimates. 
Recall that our proxy for the risk premium is the long-run IVI. An increase in the index, 
indicating reduced future risk of water stress and shortage, has a positive impact on the water 
transfer price in all four models in Table 3 where the coefficient can be identified (the RE 
models), consistent with the asset pricing model. 
The growth variable coefficient in the multi-state model is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that, consistent with asset pricing theory, growth in farmland irrigated 
acres increases water right transfer prices. Unexpectedly, the three-state sample results show a 
statistically significant, but negative coefficient associated with the growth variable. This 
counterintuitive result is not consistent with asset pricing theory. However, robustness check 
results using a growth variable proxied by crop prices are very similar showing a positive but 
 
11 An anonymous referee recommended that we also compare U.S. western water market performance to that of 
Australian water markets, using the asset pricing model. We discuss this comparison in the Appendix, section A3. 
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statistically insignificant coefficient in the nine-state sample, and a negative, statistically 
significant coefficient in the three-state sample (Appendix Table A3). 
One potential threat to identification in Table 3 is that lease prices may be endogenous. 
That is, while the asset pricing model specifies permanent water transfer prices as a function of 
one-year lease prices, lease prices could also be determined in part by transfer prices (or farmers 
may consider both options against the benefit of using water for crops). Thus, we also estimated 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) models using an instrument for the lease price: the average price 
specific to year and state excluding local state observations.  In all models, an endogeneity test 
fails to reject the hypothesis that the lease price variable is exogenous. Thus, we interpret the 
results in Table 3 as the main results and provide 2SLS results in the Appendix, Table A1.12   
Taken together, the models estimated using the multi-state data suggest that water market 
activity in the western United States is generally consistent with asset pricing theory. Given the 
fairly thin markets in this context, as well as the small dataset we are able to construct from the 
Water Strategist data, these results are encouraging. However, the difference between the 
efficiency with which information about water’s long-run value is transmitted in short-run prices, 
and that observed in New Zealand fishing quota markets and other natural resource applications, 
also suggests that these markets have significant efficiency improvement potential. 
4. Mojave water market  
While the Table 3 results are encouraging, the small sample and the heterogeneity of the markets 
in our multi-state analysis leave the analysis open to criticism that we cannot fully capture this 
 
12 The results of the IV models are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3, with one important exception – the lease 
price coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant in all reported models. We hesitate to conclude much 
from this exercise, given that our tests suggest that the lease price is not, in fact, endogenous (suggesting that IV is 
unnecessary), and the challenges to 2SLS with such a small sample. For example, the test statistics for the IV 
estimators indicate that the models are only weakly identified, resulting in low first stage F-test statistics. 
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heterogeneity when pooling state markets together and with the available data. Thus, we also 
examine the Mojave water rights market, within the Mojave River Basin Area’s jurisdiction 
located in San Bernardino County, California, to see if more active trading in a more 
homogeneous market comports more closely with the asset pricing model. The Mojave market is 
a relatively well-defined groundwater market, where monitoring and verification of water 
production responsibilities are performed by a Watermaster, which also acts as a clearinghouse 
for trades. We apply the asset pricing model to the Mojave market by re-estimating equation (4) 
with the Mojave data, instead of the multi-state data used in section 3. 
4.1 Mojave market data and model 
Summary statistics for all the variables used in the asset pricing model estimation for the Mojave 
market are presented in Table 2. We obtained water transfer data for the Mojave water rights 
market from the annual Watermaster’s water transfer reports posted on the Mojave Water 
Agency’s website (Mojave Water Agency 2016). The dataset consists of groundwater transfers 
in five subareas (Alto, Baja, Centro, Este, and Oeste).13  The data comprise price and quantity 
information for 3,368 transactions (288 permanent transfers and 3,080 one-year leases) between 
1995 and 2018.14 Table 4 summarizes the Mojave market data. As expected, and similar to the 
multi-state case, permanent transfer prices exceed lease prices. As shown in Figure 2, the 
positive correlation between the transfer and lease prices is stronger in the Mojave market than in 
the nine-state and three-state samples. That relationship becomes even clearer when we consider 
only the two most active subareas (Alto and Baja) in the sample. Price dispersion is noticeable 
across the subareas. Prices for both permanent transfers and leases are highest in the Alto 
 
13 https://www.mojavewater.org/files/mbamap_3wm931f0.pdf 
14 Originally the dataset included 4,086 observations. We dropped 718 observations with missing price information 
and when the reported price was zero. 
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subarea, followed by Oeste and Centro (Table 4). Price differences could be linked to primary 
water uses in these areas. In the Mojave Basin Area, water has five different uses: agricultural, 
municipal, golf course irrigation, industrial, and recreational. The Mojave dataset does not 
provide information about water uses at the transaction level. However, the Watermaster’s 
Annual Reports (2016) identify major water uses by subarea: Alto – urban, Baja – agricultural, 
Centro – agricultural and urban, Este – agricultural, Oeste – agricultural and urban. Thus, we can 
say that water rights prices are highest in the three areas using relatively more urban water, likely 
reflecting higher-valued uses. The Mojave dataset contains 89 observations (after converting 
transfer and lease prices to quarterly averages, as we did in the multi-state case), from the five 
subareas between 1996 and 2018. 
There are two differences between the variables in equation (4) for the multi-state asset 
pricing model described earlier, and those for the Mojave asset pricing model. First, index j 
represents a subarea in the Mojave model, instead of a state. Second, the constant growth rate (g) 
in the Mojave model is proxied by the urban and agricultural water consumption growth rate, 
rather than the growth of acres irrigated. We use urban water consumption data for the Alto, 
Centro, and Oeste subareas, and agricultural water consumption data for Baja and Este, making g 
somewhat more asset-specific than we were able to do in the multi-state context (where g varied 
only by state, because we could not identify the actual location of the transaction at a finer spatial 
scale). Water consumption data were obtained from the annual Watermaster’s reports posted on 
the Mojave Water Agency website, and they vary by subarea-year, beginning in 2000. Following 
Newell, Papps and Sanchirico (2007), as we did in the multi-state case, the growth rate variable 
is estimated using an AR(1) model (where we include the natural log of water consumption, 
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year, and a constant) for each subarea.15 The estimated value represents the likely future growth 
in demand for water, assuming the historical drivers of growth will continue into the future.  
4.2  Results for the Mojave market  
Results for the Mojave water rights market case are reported in Table 5. We estimate the same 
RE and FE models as we did in the multi-state analysis, starting with the full five-subarea 
Mojave sample in columns (1) through (3) of Table 5. The results mostly yield the expected 
coefficient signs: permanent transfer prices are positively correlated with lease prices and the 
growth rate, and negatively correlated with real interest rates. The magnitude of the lease price 
coefficient is somewhat higher (0.18-0.58) than in the nine-state sample (0.14-0.17), suggesting a 
greater influence of lease prices on transfer prices. Unexpectedly, the risk premium coefficient is 
negative and statistically insignificant, which might be impacted by the relatively smaller area 
that the Mojave Basin represents, and as a result, less variation. Also, urban water use is 
dominant in some subareas of the region, which may not be as well-represented by the IVI. 
We also estimated the same model on a sample comprising only the two most active 
subareas in the Mojave region: Alto and Baja. The majority of the quarterly observations in the 
sample (69 out of 89 area-quarters) are associated with these two areas.  The results (shown in 
columns 4 through 6 of Table 5) imply that the water market consisting of the Alto and Baja 
subareas of the Mojave exhibits the greatest efficiency among all of the markets we examine, as 
evident from the large significant coefficient on the lease price (model (5)). In the Alto and Baja 
subareas of the Mojave market, a one percent change in the one-year lease price will result in a 
74 percent change in the permanent water rights price. (The signs for the remaining estimated 
 
15 The Durbin’s h test statistic of no autocorrelation was not rejected. The values for water consumption by subarea 
were not reported until 2000; thus, our proxy is estimated using data from 2000-2018, but the constant growth 
variable is applied to the entire dataset, 1996-2018. 
			 17 
coefficients are also consistent with asset pricing theory.) As in the multi-state asset pricing 
model, there is a potential concern about endogenous lease prices, but endogeneity tests suggest 
that the lease price is exogenous; for completeness, IV results are reported in the Appendix, 
Table A2, using the same instruments as in the multi-state case (average lease prices by region-
year, excluding local observations). Note that we cannot identify the risk premium (IVI) 
coefficient in the two-area models, due to insufficient variation.  
The results for the Mojave market, a market that is known to have fewer barriers to trade 
in comparison to the multi-state markets, suggest that there is significant potential for efficiency 
improvements in other water markets if barriers to trade were addressed. 
 5. Conclusions 
We examine the degree to which U.S. western water market prices in nine states act as asset 
pricing theory would predict. Findings suggest that water market transactions do generally 
comport with the asset pricing model; for example, permanent water transfer prices are positively 
correlated with one-year lease prices and negatively correlated with the real interest rate. 
However, the smaller coefficients associated with lease prices in the water markets in 
comparison to fishing quota markets suggest significant potential for market efficiency 
improvements in the water market case.  
 We find that water market efficiency is highest in one of the most active U.S. water rights 
markets located in the Mojave Basin Area—markets that are known to have lower barriers to 
trade.  The coefficients on water lease prices are higher in the Mojave markets than in other 
water markets and, in the case of the two most active areas of the Mojave market, the coefficient 
on lease prices is almost as high as those in New Zealand fishing quota markets. This difference 
in results suggests that there is significant potential for efficiency improvements in water rights 
			 18 
markets in the western U.S., which could lead to higher welfare gains from the reallocation of 
water. 
Taken together, the results provide reason for optimism about water rights markets in the 
western U.S.  Comparing water rights transfers in the U.S. with other natural resource markets 
allows us to better understand the efficiency potential in these increasingly common markets for 
created natural resource assets. It is likely that a significant portion of the differences in the 
relationship between short-term and permanent transfers across different water rights markets, as 
well as other natural resource markets, can be attributed to the institutions that define and govern 
these markets. Poor governance across many water markets in the western U.S. is often 
expressed by the lack of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement. Most surface water and 
some groundwater rights in the western U.S. are governed by the prior appropriation doctrine, 
where water rights are allocated based on seniority (“first in time, first in right”) leading to 
greater market frictions. This allocation rule tends to be less significant for short-term transfers, 
which also tend to be associated with lower transaction costs due to a simpler administrative 
process.  Some regional water markets in the western U.S. are well-functioning. The market in 
the Mojave River Basin is one of them, which is supported by our findings. Transactions in this 
market are well recorded and managed, and rights are not allocated based on “first in time, first 
in right”, allowing for faster and less costly transfers. 
The ability to quantify the efficiency of water rights transfers as a whole provides an 
opportunity to measure progress in market development, learn from better-functioning markets, 
and as a result, advance policies to reduce barriers to water trading. Continuation of the analysis 
of the price relationship between short- and long-term water transfers is necessary; however, 
more available data is needed to advance our empirical assessment. Our analysis of the western 
			 19 
U.S. region was limited with the dataset ending in 2010. Various water management efforts have 
been progressing since then that are likely to affect water accessibility and management to 
different water stakeholders in the near future. Examples include: so-called “smart market” 
development (Young & Brozović 2016); an attempt to redefine the seniority rule based on the 
Australian example in Diamond Valley, Nevada (Young 2015, Zeff et al. 2019, Wheeler et al. 
2017); the existence of local informal water transfers (Young & Brozović 2019); and an increase 
in groundwater protection efforts (e.g., Sustainable Groundwater Management Act in California; 
Babbitt et al. 2017). Further work that examines the multilayered water rights structures, policies 
and regulations that support efficient resource reallocation could make a valuable contribution to 
enhancing water markets’ capacity to mitigate anticipated future reductions or increased 
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Qty. leased (AF) Qty. transferred (AF) Lease price ($/AF) Transfer price ($/AF) 
to urb to ag total to urb to ag total urb ag total urb ag total 
AZ 2.3 2.6 259253 237671 222668 3585 825 3380 103 59 68 1347 835 1182 
CA 12.1 2.2 14464 8523 9371 12206 9978 11839 130 68 91 2129 953 1998 
CO 3.4 64.0 7903 5304 8042 148 31 115 100 29 78 10456 7184 10142 
ID 3.4 1.7 11805 15557 15583 1140 1700 1604 14 11 12 645 1095 988 
NM 1.0 2.2 n/a 22455 22455 164 774 232 n/a 46 46 4177 2701 4013 
NV 1.0 2.3 7700 448 5283 625 n/a 625 45 43 45 9243 n/a 9243 
TX 9.1 3.7 1885 7413 3852 10025 7217 9196 224 31 162 1655 1288 1618 
UT 1.4 1.8 3037 9944 9312 677 94 538 181 7 30 1693 1410 1566 
WA 1.4 1.4 1320 5352 5005 15209 1370 15336 80 34 39 819 266 842 
Total 26.7 76.0 10809 19505 16951 884 1101 849 183 49 109 9342 5780 8944 
Note: All statistics are yearly averages weighted by number of transactions that occurred in each year during the period 1990-2010. Most states do not have 
observations for every year of this period. Number of leases and number of transfers indicate an annual average number of 1-year leases and permanent transfers 
for each state, conditional on a lease/transfer (e.g., AZ had 23 permanent transfers, which occurred during 9 years during 1990-2010; hence, the annual average 
number of transfers is 2.6). Qty. leased and transferred is an annual average transferred to urban, to agricultural, and to both (total) uses. Lease and transfer prices 
indicate annual average price per acre-foot paid for water to be used in urban, agricultural, and both (total) sectors. Total average (bottom row) is the mean of 21 
yearly averages over the period 1990-2010 without state weights (e.g., total of 1,597 transfers across the 9 states during 21 years is 76 transfers/year); the total 
average in the bottom row does not equal the sum of state averages due to the unbalanced panel (e.g., in Arizona, permanent transfers occurred in 9 years during 
the 1990-2010 period, but only 8 of those years showed transactions to urban uses, and only 3 of those years showed transactions to agricultural uses).  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Asset pricing Models 
  Nine-state model Mojave market model 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Transfer price ($/AF) 4504.23 6451.63 76.44 28298.85 2108.13 1794.43 58.51 5546.25 
Lease price ($/AF) 95.25 108.57 1.47 559.48 122.63 123.01 1.00 422.58 
Growth rate: 
        
Farm acres irrigated  0.10 0.35 -0.76 0.75 
    
Water consumption 
    
0.50 0.26 0.13 0.95 
Risk premium:  

















Real interest rate 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
Areas (J) 9 states: AZ, CA, CO, ID, NM, NV, TX, UT, WA 5 Subareas: Alto, Baja, Centro, Este, Oeste 
Quarters (Q) 4 4 
Years (T) 18 (1992-2009) 24 (1995-2018) 
Observations (N) 66 89 
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Time trend  ____  ____  0.070***  
(0.013)  
____  ____  0.068***  
(0.017)  
State controls  FE  RE  RE  FE  RE  RE  
N (obs)  66  66  66  53  53  53  
R2  0.212  0.053  0.106  0.269  0.724  0.788  
Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are 
robust standard errors clustered by state. All models include a constant. Robustness checks using a 
different proxy (major irrigated crop prices instead of acres-irrigated) for the growth rate variable are 



















Alto 86.1 7.3 224 199 174 2908 
Baja 23.8 3.3 119 115 25 349 
Centro 6.4 3.7 226 331 43 1263 
Este 9.0 1.7 47 199 36 494 
Oeste 3.6 1.2 370 704 67 2486 
Total 128 12.0 197 219 137 1710 
Note: All statistics are yearly averages. The total 5-subarea market statistics are yearly averages without 
subarea weights.  
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Time trend ____ ____ 0.043** 
(0.018) 
____ ____ 0.025 
(0.018) 
Subarea controls FE RE RE FE RE RE 
N (obs) 89 89 89 69 69 69 
R2 0.480 0.717 0.799 0.756 0.903 0.914 
Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are 
robust standard errors, clustered by state. All models include a constant. The proxy for the growth rate 
variable is historical urban water consumption in the case of Alto, Centro and Oeste and agricultural 










Figure 1. Average number of transactions and quantity traded (top) and average prices of 










Figure 2. Average (quarterly) lease and transfer prices in the multi-state data and the 




A1. Additional water transfer dataset description   
The full nine-state water transactions sample from the Water Strategist includes 5,099 
observations. The original data included 12 states (5,467 transactions); however, two of those 
states (Oregon and Wyoming) had no recorded permanent transfers and one state (Montana) had 
only one recorded permanent transfer. Both permanent transfers and one-year leases within a 
state-year are required to empirically estimate the asset pricing model; therefore, these three 
states were dropped from our sample.  
 Buyers and sellers are grouped into three main categories: agricultural, urban, and 
environmental sectors. Water rights transactions generally happen in one of three forms: 
permanent transfers, one-year leases and multi-year leases. Long–term leases vary greatly in 
length across observations (2 to 100 years) and represent the smallest number of transactions in 
this dataset. In this study, we focus on two types of market transactions: water rights permanent 
transfers and one-year leases. We omit observations associated with recycled effluent water, 
storage rights, and multi-year leases.16 In order to provide a better understanding of quantities 
and prices in the market, we also omit observations with missing prices, prices lower than 
$1/acre-foot, and unidentified buyers. 17   
Water market issues related to environmental flows are unique, complex, and beyond the 
scope of this paper; we eliminate 529 transactions involving that sector. The agricultural sector is 
 
16 154 (out of 5,099) observations are associated with reclaimed effluent water; 47 (out of 5,099) trades involve 
storage rights; 407 (out of 5,099) observations are leasing contracts for longer than 1-year period. (The groups of 
omitted observations are not mutually exclusive.) 
17 The actual price of the transaction was missing in 1,423 (out of 5,099) transactions, mostly for the following 
reasons: 1) the price was not provided; 2) the price was provided for a transaction that included both land and water; 
or 3) water rights were dedicated or exchanged for in-kind services. We dropped 32 transactions with a price lower 
than $1/af. We also dropped two outliers with one-year lease prices higher than $5,400/af, (the average one-year 
lease price is $109/af).  We also dropped 419 transactions not reporting the sector of the buyer. 
			 36 
the largest water supplier in the western states; thus, we keep only those transactions that were 
associated with water coming from agricultural irrigators, eliminating the 702/5,099 water 
transactions where the urban sector was the seller or lessor. 
A2. Irrigation Vulnerability Index  
The Irrigation Vulnerability Index (IVI) is constructed as in Liu et al. (2017), using their data to 
construct our proxy for the risk premium (!) in the asset pricing models. In this approach, 
irrigation vulnerability is defined as:  
(water supply – water use) / irrigation water use  
 
where water supply is the sum of surface water (including reservoir storage) and renewable 
groundwater sources.  Water use is the sum of irrigation, domestic, industrial, and livestock 
water use. Lower values of the index indicate higher levels of water stress. An irrigation 
vulnerability < 0.2 is considered stressed. Irrigation vulnerability can have negative values, 
which occur where unsustainable water supplies are used to fulfill the water use category. 
 Water supply, water use, and irrigation water use are simulated by the University of New 
Hampshire’s Water Balance Model (WBM) at the grid cell level and at a daily time step and 
provided here as state-level (and basin-level for the Mojave), annual aggregates.  Where water 
supply is less than water use, unsustainable groundwater is used to fulfill the water use 
requirement.  
 WBM simulations for 2013 – 2099 are driven by the GISS-E2-R RCP 8.5 climate 
scenario, bias-corrected using the delta change method. The obtained annual IVI values were 
averaged over this long-run period for each state to show the mean projection for long-term 
water stress. Results suggest that Arizona is projected to be most stressed in irrigation water 
availability followed by California, Texas, and Colorado (Table A4). 
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Note the exceptionally high value of the index for the state of Nevada. While this is an unusual 
value, Nevada contributes a small number of transactions to our multi-state sample, and the main 
results are robust to dropping Nevada (along with all other states except California, Colorado and 
Texas), as noted in the discussion of Table 3 in the main paper. Thus, this value does not appear 
to substantially influence our results. 
 
A.2.1. WBM methods and data for simulating water use and water supply 
Note: these methods have been published before, and the relevant citations are: Wisser et al. 
(2010), Grogan (2016), and Liu et al. (2017). 
Irrigation water use 
Input data 
Inputs to WBM for simulation irrigation water use are: crops maps, soil properties, crop 
parameters, daily mean temperature, and daily precipitation. Crop maps (i.e., the location, 
growing area, and growing season) are from the MIRCA2000 data base (Portmann et al 2000).  
Soil properties – namely, field capacity and soil available water capacity – are from the 
Harmonized World Soil Database v1.1 (FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC, 2009).  Crop 
parameters kc, CDFc, and RDc are from Siebert and Döll (2010). We use the GISS-E2-R global 
circulation model (Schmidt et al., 2014) representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 to 
provide temperature and precipitation inputs. 
 
Method 
In WBM, crops extract water from the soil moisture each day of the crop’s growing season.  
Given sufficient water in the soil moisture pool, the amount of water used by each crop is the 





where PET0 [mm] is a reference evapotranspiration, and kc [-] is a crop-specific, time-varying 
scalar.  This method follows the FAO-recommended crop-modeling methodology outlined in 
Allen et al (1998).  Here, we use the Penman-Monteith method for estimating PET0 (Allen et al, 
1998). 
  
If soil moisture levels fall below a crop-specific threshold, SMTc [mm], then irrigation water is 




where CDFc [-] is a crop depletion factor, RDc [mm] is the crop’s root depth, and AWcap [-] is 
the soil’s available water capacity. 
  
When soil moisture is below SMTc, then the time step’s net irrigation water demand, Inet,t, is the 




where Fcap [mm] is the soil’s field capacity, and SMt [mm] is the soil moisture at time t.  Annual 
net irrigation water use is the sum of all daily net irrigation water uses through the year. We 
assume no shortage of water for irrigation; when water supply is insufficient to meet the crop’s 
irrigation water requirement, then additional water is added to the soil moisture from an 
unlimited “unsustainable” water source.   
 




Data inputs for domestic and industrial water use are: domestic per capita water use, industrial 
per capita water use, and population density.  Time series of domestic per capita water use, 
DWpp and industrial per capita water use, IWpp, are from Liu et al (2017).  Annual population 




In WBM, the domestic and industrial sectors use water each day.  Domestic water use, Dw [mm], 
is: 
 "#	 = 	& ⋅ "()) ⋅ "*+*, 
and industrial water use, Iw [mm] is: 
 ,#	 = 	& ⋅ ,()) ⋅ "*+*, 
 
where 
A [km2] is the area of the grid cell 
DWpp [mm/d] is the domestic water use per capita 
IWpp [mm/d] is the industrial water use per capita  
Dpop [persons km-2] is the population density. 
  
Livestock water use 
 
Input data 
Input data for livestock water use are: average daily temperature, livestock density for each 
livestock category, service water per head, and two growth parameters. All livestock data and 
methods are from FAO (2006) and FAO employee Dominik Wisser (personal communication); 
the same temperature inputs are used here as in the irrigation water use section. 
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Method 
Daily livestock water, Lw, for each livestock type is calculated each day as: 
-. = ,/ + 1/ ∙ 34 + 5(/ ∙ "/ 
where  
Il is an intercept parameter for livestock type l  
sl is a slope parameter for livestock type l [-] 
Tm is the daily mean temperature, with a minimum value of 0 [°C] 
SWl is the daily service water volume required per animal  
Dl is the density of livestock type l in the grid cell. 
 




To simulate water supply, WBM requires inputs to represent rivers, reservoirs on those rivers, 
and the water budget of non-agricultural lands (including impervious areas).  The river data is the 
STN-30p river network (Vörösmarty et al., 2000), and reservoir and dam inputs are from the 
GRanD database (Lehner et al., 2011). Soil properties of non-agricultural lands are from the 
Harmonized World Soil Database v1.1 (FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC, 2009), and 
impervious surface data is from the Global Distribution and Density of Constructed Impervious 
Surfaces database (Elvidge et al., 2007). 
 
Method 
Water supply is the sum of surface water (including reservoir storage) and renewable 
groundwater sources. Renewable groundwater is defined as the volume of water stored via 
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percolation through soils, minus the volume of water exiting the groundwater stores as baseflow.  
Details for surface water and renewable groundwater methods are provided in Wisser et al 
(2010) and Grogan (2016).   
 
 
A3. Australian water market results 
At the suggestion of a referee, we estimated the basic asset pricing model (shown in equation 
(1)) using Australian water market transaction data.  
6789: = 69:87:/<          (1) 
Our empirical approach adapts equation (4) from the paper. Specifically, 9=6>?@A = BC +
BD9=E>?@A + BF<@A + µA + H? + I>?@A,	where 9=6 is the log price of entitlement transfer i (similar 
to permanent water rights transfer in the U.S.), in state ?, in quarter @, and in year A; 9=E is the 
log price allocation transfer (similar to one year lease in the U.S.); < is the quarterly real 
Australian market interest rate; µ is a year fixed effect;	H is a state fixed effect or random effect; 
and I is the error term. Note that we omit the growth rate and risk premium variables, lacking 
available data for this extra analysis outside of the United States, the site of our main analysis. 
 The Australian water transaction dataset was downloaded from the Australian 
Government Bureau of Meteorology. We obtained allocation and entitlement transfers from 
2007-2018 for five states for which both transfer type data were available: New South Wales, 
South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia. Similar to our approach for the U.S. 
markets, we omitted observations that lacked price information, were associated with bundled 
water and land transfers, or were described as temporary entitlement transfers.  
Transaction prices ($/ML) were converted to 2009 Australian dollars using the consumer 
price index (CPI) obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The real interest rate was 
			 42 
calculated by using Australian 90-day T-bill rate available via the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and adjusting for inflation using CPI – similar to the 
U.S. models reported in the paper. The final quarterly averaged dataset comprised 165 
observations. 
 Table A5 provides the results using two models: fixed effects (1), and random effects (2). 
Results using both approaches yield the expected coefficient signs: entitlement transfer prices are 
positively correlated with allocation transfer prices, and negatively correlated with real interest 
rates. Like our U.S. results, these results for Australia are consistent with asset pricing theory. 
However, given limits to data availability, we do not directly compare these results to those in 
the paper. A complete application of the asset pricing model to the Australian water market case 
would be an important extension of our analysis of the western U.S. water markets, and an 
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Table A1. Asset Pricing Model IV Estimation Results for the Multi-State Sample 


































Risk premium: Irrigation 





















Time trend ____ ____ 0.069*** 
(0.013) 
____ ____ 0.069*** 
(0.016) 
State controls FE RE RE FE RE RE 
N (obs) 66 66 66 53 53 53 
R2 0.176 0.053 0.096 0.268 0.724 0.772 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 3.404 3.683 3.670 3.789 3.789 3.702 
Kleibergen-Paap rk.Wald F 
statistic 
3.614 3.735 3.744 2.742 2.580 2.659 
p-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic 
0.169 0.169 0.177 0.178 0.178 0.184 
p-value of Endogeneity test 0.705 0.707 0.910 0.972 0.981 0.613 
Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are robust standard 
errors clustered by state. p-value for Hansen J statistic not provided because the equation is exactly identified.  
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Table A2. Asset Pricing Model IV Estimation Results for the Mojave Market (Dependent 
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Subarea controls FE RE RE FE RE RE 
N (obs) 89 89 89 69 69 69 
R2 -21.405 0.552 0.528 -14000 0.147 0.704 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 0.593 11.538 5.238 0.000 0.000 4.240 
Kleibergen-Paap rk.Wald F 
statistic 
0.566 3.356 2.278 0.000 0.000 0.437 
p-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic 
0.498 0.141 0.224 0.993 0.993 0.530 
p-value of Endogeneity test 0.396 0.131 0.131 0.771 0.000 0.000 
Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are robust standard 




Table A3. Robustness Check: Asset Pricing Model Results for the Nine-State Sample with 
Different Growth Rate Proxy (Dependent Variable: Log Transfer Price) 
 
  (1)  
(9 states)  
(2)  
(9 states)  
(3)  
(9 states)  
(4)  
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(3 states)  
(6)  
(3 states)  




















Risk premium: Irrigation 





















Time trend  ____ ____ 0.070*** 
(0.013) 
____ ____ 0.068*** 
(0.017) 
State controls  FE RE RE FE RE RE 
N (obs)  66 66 66 53 53 53 
R2  0.212 0.154 0.199 0.269 0.724 0.788 
Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are robust 
standard errors clustered by state. All models include a constant. Growth rate proxy in this model is constructed for 
each state based on prices of the type of crop which uses a significant amount of irrigation water in its production. 
The major crops were determined based on analyzing the values for irrigated area harvested, irrigated crop/acre 
yield, and average AF of water applied for acre provided in the USDA Water Management and Irrigation Survey. 
Specifically, we used annual prices from 1990-2018 available at USDA for alfalfa (AZ), corn (CO, NM, TX, WA), 
rice (CA), and wheat (ID, NV, UT), and constructed the time invariant growth rate variable using the AR(1) 




Table A4: Average long-term Irrigation Vulnerability Index by state 












Table A5: Asset Pricing Model Estimation Results for Australian Water Transfers, 2007-
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(5states) 








Year Controls Yes Yes 
State Controls FE RE 
N (obs) 165 165 
R2 0.155 0.223 
Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are 
standard errors clustered by state, which have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. All models include a 
constant. Observations are from five states: New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and 
Western Australia. 
